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Abstract
In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we con-
sider social welfare functions satisfying Arrows requirements, i.e. weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space is a one-
dimensional continuum such a welfare function is determined by a collection
of 2N strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corollary
we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is
transitive if and only if each voters preference is strictly quasi-concave.
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1 Introduction
A social welfare function is a procedure for aggregating proles of individual prefer-
ences into social orderings. Arrows theorem shows that it is impossible for a social
welfare function to satisfy weak Pareto (if all individuals strictly prefer one alterna-
tive to another, then so does society), independence of irrelevant alternatives (the
social ranking of two alternatives only depends on the individual rankings of these
two alternatives), and non-dictatorship when the preference domain is unrestricted.
When the set of alternatives is structured, the assumption of unrestricted domain
might be unreasonable. Although the assumption of unrestricted domain is unrea-
sonable in economic environments, it has been shown that Arrows theorem remains
valid in most of these environments.1
There is one well-known economic environment in which Arrows requirements are
consistent. In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences, alterna-
tives are points in a Euclidean space of issue positions and individual preferences are
continuous, quasi-concave, and have bliss points. If the number of voters is odd, then
simple majority voting is transitive and satises weak Pareto, independence of irrele-
vant alternatives, and anonymity (Black ,1948; Arrow, 1951, 1963). Simple majority
voting is one example of an Arrovian welfare function belonging to the following class:
if the number of voters is n, x n 1 preferences of constant voters, and apply to each
prole of individual preferences majority voting over this prole and the n  1 xed
voters. However, a characterization of all welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives was missing. Our paper lls this gap. The
class of welfare functions described above, in which the preferences of the xed voters
are strictly quasi-concave, is characterized by weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and anonymity up to a tie-breaking rule. If anonymity is dropped, then
instead of n  1 xed preferences we need 2N xed strictly quasi-concave preferences.
A key step in the proof of Arrows theorem is that decisiveness of a coalition
1An excellent review of the literature is Le Breton and Weymark (1996,2000).
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spreads from one pair of alternatives to all pairs of alternatives. In proving the
previous fact we need to assume that each individuals preference domain is unre-
stricted. This is the di¤erence between one-dimensional single-peaked environments
and environments with an unrestricted domain. We show that in one-dimensional
single-peaked environments decisiveness of a coalition spreads in the following way:
if a coalition is decisive over a preferred to b(where a; b 2 R are such that a < b),
then it is decisive over a preferred to cfor all b < c and over c preferred to bfor
all a < c < b. This implies that for each coalition S, there is a point xS 2 [ 1;+1]
such that S is decisive over a preferred to bfor all xS < a < b and NnS is decisive
over c preferred to dfor all d < c < xS. Therefore, when the peaks of S converge
to  1 and the peaks of NnS to +1, then an Arrovian welfare function chooses a
strictly quasi-concave ordering with quasi bliss point xS. The collection of 2N strictly
quasi-concave preferences characterizes an Arrovian welfare function up to some tie-
breaking rule. Here, the key is to show that if the ranking over two alternatives is
not determined, then this does not cause any intransitivities, no matter what ranking
we choose between these two alternatives. Of course, this is only possible if the two
alternatives belong to opposite sides of the quasi bliss point of the social ordering and
could form an indi¤erence class.
Our characterization is one of the few positive results in Arrovian social choice.
A corollary of our result is that simple majority voting is transitive if and only if
individual preferences are strictly quasi-concave.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our notation and
the main denitions. In Section 3 we characterize the welfare functions satisfying
weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives if the policy space is one-
dimensional. Section 4 concludes.
3
2 Notation and Denitions
We use the same terminology and notation as Le Breton and Weymark (2000). Let
N  f1; 2; : : : ; ng denote a nite set of agents with n  2, let R denote the set of
real numbers, and let A denote a set of alternatives. Each point in R identies the
changes in the level of a certain policy, for example public spending on police or health
care. In an election each element of R represents a candidates political ideology on a
left-right spectrum. Throughout we will assume that A = R, although all our results
apply to any environment where the set of alternatives is an interval.
Let W denote the set of all complete and transitive relations over A. An element
of W is called a weak ordering over A. Given Ri 2 W, the corresponding strict
relation, Pi, and the indi¤erence relation, Ii, are dened as follows: for all a; b 2 A,
(i) aPib , :bRia, and (ii) aIib , aRib and bRia. Note that if :aRib, then by
completeness of Ri, aRib. Hence, :bRia is enough to describe the strict relation Pi.
Given i 2 N , a weak ordering Ri 2 W is single-peaked if there exists a point
p(Ri) 2 R, called the peak of Ri (or the bliss point of Ri), such that for all a; b 2 R,
if a < b  p(Ri) or p(Ri)  b < a, then bPia. Let R denote the set of all single-
peaked preferences over R. Each agent i 2 N has a single-peaked preference relation
over R. A single-peaked preference Ri 2 R is symmetric if for all a; b 2 R, aRib ,
ja  p(Ri)j  jb  p(Ri)j.
A (preference) prole is a list R  (Ri)i2N 2 RN . A (social) welfare function
associates with each prole a weak ordering over A. Formally, a welfare function is
a mapping f : RN ! W such that for all R 2 RN , f(R) 2 W. We call f(R) the
social ordering (that f associates with R). Note that f(R) need not belong to the
individual preference domain R. Other authors impose the restriction that any social
ordering belongs to each individuals preference domain (for example, Peters, van der
Stel, and Storcken, 1992, and Bossert and Weymark, 1993).
Arrows requirements are as follows. The rst axiom says that if all agents strictly
prefer a to b, then a should also be socially strictly preferred to b.
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Weak Pareto: For all R 2 RN and all a; b 2 A, if for all i 2 N , aPib, then :bf(R)a.
Given R 2 RN , X  A, and j 2 N , let RjjX denote the restriction of Rj to
X, and RjX  (RijX)i2N . The second axiom says that the social ordering of two
alternatives only depends on the prole of individual preferences restricted to these
two alternatives.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all R; R 2 RN and all a; b 2 A,
if Rjfa; bg = Rjfa; bg, then f(R)jfa; bg = f( R)jfa; bg.
A welfare function is Arrovian if it satises weak Pareto and independence of ir-
relevant alternatives. A welfare function is dictatorial if there exists some agent such
that for each prole the social strict preference relation respects the strict preference
relation of this agent.
Non-Dictatorship: There exists no i 2 N such that for all R 2 RN and all
a; b 2 A, if aPib, then :bf(R)a.
A welfare function treats individuals symmetrically if for all permutations of in-
dividualspreferences, the social ordering remains unchanged.
Anonymity: For all R 2 RN and all permutations  of N , f((R)) = f(R).
3 One-Dimensional Policy Spaces
We will give a complete characterization of all welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives for one-dimensional single-peaked envi-
ronments. In showing this characterization we proceed as follows:
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First, we describe a class of weak orderings which are almost single-peaked,
namely the class of strictly quasi-concave preferences. These weak orderings will be
important for any Arrovian welfare function.
Second, we show how decisiveness spreads for Arrovian welfare functions from one
pair of alternatives to other pairs of alternatives.
Third, we enlarge the domain of single-peaked preferences by adding the-relation
and the -relation. This has no e¤ect on an Arrovian welfare function but allows
us to consider social orderings at maximal conicts where each agents preference is
either the -relation or the -relation. Any such social ordering belongs to the class
of strictly quasi-concave orderings. Then we show that for any prole of single-peaked
preferences the social ordering is strictly quasi-concave.
Finally, we show that the social orderings at maximal conicts determine any
Arrovian welfare function up to a tie-breaking rule.
3.1 Strictly Quasi-Concave Preferences
A weak ordering Ri 2 W is strictly quasi-concave, if for all a; b; c 2 R such that
a < b < c, we have :aRib or :cRib. In other words, b is never a worst alternative in
fa; b; cg and the restriction of Ri to fa; b; cg is single-peaked . Let C denote the set
of all strictly quasi-concave orderings over R.
Lemma 3.1 Let Ri 2 W. The weak ordering Ri is strictly quasi-concave if and only
if there exists a quasi bliss point p(Ri) 2 R [ f 1;+1g (for convenience we use
the same notation as for peaks) such that (i) for all a; b 2 R, if a < b < p(Ri) or
p(Ri) < b < a, then bPia, and (ii) if p(Ri) 2 R, then either (for all x 2 ] 1; p(Ri)[,
p(Ri)Pix), or (for all x 2 ]p(Ri);+1[, p(Ri)Pix).
Proof. It is easy to check that Ri is strictly quasi-concave if (i) and (ii) hold.
Let Ri be strictly quasi-concave. For all x 2 R, let B(x;Ri)  fy 2 R jxRiyg. Let
(xk)k2N be a sequence in R such that for all k 2 N, if B(xk; Ri) 6= R, then B(xk; Ri) (
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B(xk+1; Ri), and for all y 2 R, there exists k 2 N such that y 2 B(xk; Ri). Without
loss of generality, let (xk)k2N converge to p(Ri) (otherwise we choose a convergent
subsequence of (xk)k2N). We show (i) and (ii).
Let a; b 2 R be such that a < b < p(Ri) or p(Ri) < b < a. Then there exists k 2 N
such that b 2 B(xk; Ri) and jxk   p(Ri)j < jb   p(Ri)j. Thus, xkRib and a < b < xk
or xk < b < a. Because Ri is strictly quasi-concave, bPia, which is (i).
Suppose that p(Ri) 2 R but (ii) does not hold. Then for some a; b 2 R we have
a < p(Ri) < b, aRip(Ri), and bRip(Ri). Obviously, this is in contradiction to strict
quasi-concavity of Ri. 
Obviously, R  C. However, a strictly quasi-concave preference Ri may not be
single-peaked, even if p(Ri) 2 R. For example, let u : R ! R be such that for all
x 2 R, u(x)  1
x
if x > 0 and u(x) = x if x  0. Let Ru 2 W be such that for
all a; b 2 R, aRub , u(a)  u(b). Then p(Ru) = 0, for all x > 0, xPup(Ru), and
Ru 2 CnR.
3.2 Decisiveness
Given S  N and a; b 2 A, we say that S is semi-decisive over a preferred to b
if there exists R 2 RN such that (i) for all i 2 S, aPib, (ii) for all i 2 NnS, bPia,
and (iii) af(R)b.2 Let Ds(a; b) denote the set of all coalitions that are semi-decisive
over a preferred to b. Given a; b 2 A and R 2 R, if :bf(R)a whenever aPib for all
i 2 S, then S is said to be decisive over a preferred to b. Let D(a; b) denote the
set of all coalitions that are decisive over a preferred to b.
One of the important steps in Arrows impossibility theorem is that whenever a
coalition S  N is decisive over a preferred to b, then it is also decisive over a
preferred to cand c preferred to bfor any other alternative c. Therefore, every
2The literature on Arrovian social choice often refers to our denition as a coalition is semi-
decisive over the pair (a; b).
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coalition is either decisive over every pair of alternatives or over no pair.
Because here individual preferences are restricted to be single-peaked and the pol-
icy space is one-dimensional, decisiveness of a coalition does not spread over all pairs
of alternatives as in Arrows original theorem. Decisiveness of a coalition expands in
a weaker form. Given a; b 2 R such that a < b, if S is semi-decisive over a preferred
to b, then S is decisive over a preferred to cfor all c 2 ]b;+1[ and S is decisive
over c preferred to bfor all c 2 ]a; b[.
Lemma 3.2 Let f : RN ! W be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let S  N and a; b; c 2 R be such that
a < b < c or a > b > c.
(i) If S 2 Ds(a; b), then S 2 D(a; c).
(ii) If S 2 Ds(a; c), then S 2 D(b; c).
Proof. First, we show (i). Let R 2 RN be such that for all i 2 S, aPic. We have
to show that :cf(R)a. Let ~R 2 RN be such that
(a) for all i 2 N , ~Rijfa; cg = Rijfa; cg;
(b) for all i 2 S, a ~Pib and b ~Pic; and
(c) for all i 2 NnS, b ~Pia and b ~Pic.
It is easy to check that we can nd ~R 2 RN such that (a) to (c) are satised (for
all i 2 N , we can even choose ~Ri to be symmetric). By (b) and (c), for all i 2 N , b ~Pic.
Thus, by weak Pareto, :cf( ~R)b. Because S 2 Ds(a; b) and f satises independence
of irrelevant alternatives, (b) and (c) imply af( ~R)b. Thus, by transitivity of f( ~R),
:cf( ~R)a. Hence, by (a) and independence of irrelevant alternatives, :cf(R)a and
S 2 D(a; c), the desired conclusion.
Second, we show (ii). Let R 2 RN be such that for all i 2 S, bPic. We have to
show that :cf(R)b. Let ~R 2 RN be such that
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(a) for all i 2 N , ~Rijfb; cg = Rijfb; cg,
(b) for all i 2 S, b ~Pia and a ~Pic, and
(c) for all i 2 NnS, b ~Pia and c ~Pia.
(Again, for all i 2 N , ~Ri can be chosen to be symmetric.) By weak Pareto,
:af( ~R)b. Because S 2 Ds(a; c), we have af( ~R)c. Thus, by transitivity of f( ~R),
:cf( ~R)b. By (a) and independence of irrelevant alternatives, :cf(R)b. Hence, S 2
D(b; c), the desired conclusion. 
3.3 Social Orderings at Maximal Conicts
In avoiding limits of proles we add two non-single-peaked preferences to the set R.
Obviously,  and  are preferences over R, where  has a bliss point at +1 and 
at  1.
Let ~R  R [ f;g. The following lemma shows that the addition of  and 
to R has no inuence on a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence
of irrelevant alternatives.
Lemma 3.3 Let f : RN ! W be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Dene ~f : ~RN ! W as follows: for all
R 2 ~RN and all a; b 2 R, take R 2 RN such that Rjfa; bg = Rjfa; bg and set
~f(R)jfa; bg  f( R)jfa; bg:
Then ~f is a well-dened welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Moreover, ~f jRN = f .
Proof. Let R 2 ~RN . Because f satises independence of irrelevant alternatives, for
all a; b 2 R, ~f(R)jfa; bg is well-dened. Thus, ~f satises weak Pareto and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. Obviously, ~f(R) is complete. It remains to show that
~f(R) is transitive. Let a; b; c 2 R be such that a  b  c. Let R 2 RN be such that
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for all i 2 N , (i) if Ri = , then p( Ri) = a, (ii) if Ri 2 R, then Ri = Ri, and (iii)
if Ri = , then p( Ri) = c. By denition, ~f(R)jfa; b; cg = f( R)jfa; b; cg and ~f(R) is
transitive. 
Given a coalition S  N , we consider the prole where the members belonging to
S announce  and the other agents announce . Clearly, the coalitions S and NnS
disagree on every pair of di¤erent alternatives. We show that the social orderings
at these proles of maximal conicts are strictly quasi-concave. They also satisfy a
certain monotonicity property and determine for each prole the social ordering up
to some tie-breaking when social preference can be chosen to be arbitrary.
Throughout the remaining part of Subsection 3.3, let f be a welfare function
satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all S  N , let
(S;NnS) be the prole R 2 ~RN such that for all i 2 S, Ri = , and for all i 2 NnS,
Ri = . Then for all S  N , let QS  ~f(S;NnS). Let Q  fQS jS  Ng. We call
Q a collection of calibration relations. We will show that Q completely determines f
(up to some tie-breaking). By Lemma 3.3, ~f satises weak Pareto. Thus, Q; = 
and QN = . The following condition is a translation of Lemma 3.2 to collections of
calibration relations.
Denition 3.1 Let Q be a collection of calibration relations and a; b; c 2 R be such
that a < b < c. The collection Q is (inclusive) monotone if for all S; T  N such
that S  T the following holds:
(a) if aQSb, then :cQTa;
(b) if aQSc, then :cQT b;
(c) if cQT b, then :aQSc; and
(d) if cQTa, then :aQSb.
The following lemma species some properties of the collection Q.
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Lemma 3.4 (i) The collection Q is (inclusive) monotone.
(ii) For all S  N , QS 2 C.
(iii) For all S; T  N , if S  T , then p(QT )  p(QS).
Proof. (i) By denition, QS = ~f(S;NnS) and QT = ~f(T ;NnT ). If aQSb, then
S 2 Ds(a; b). Thus, by Lemma 3.2, S 2 D(a; c). Hence, by S  T , we have :cQTa
and (a) of Denition 3.1 holds. Statements (b), (c), and (d) of Denition 3.1 follow
similarly from Lemma 3.2.
(ii) Let a; b; c 2 R be such that a < b < c. Suppose that aQSb and cQSb. Since
Q is (inclusive) monotone, (a) of Denition 3.1 implies :cQSa, and (c) of Denition
3.1 implies :aQSc, which contradicts completeness of QS.
(iii) Suppose that p(QT ) > p(QS). Let a; b; c 2 ]p(QS); p(QT )[ be such that
a < b < c. Then aQSb and S 2 Ds(a; b). Thus, by Lemma 3.2, S 2 D(a; c). By
S  T , aQT c. This is a contradiction to a < c < p(QT ) and QT 2 C. 
Recall that a strictly quasi-concave preference Ri 2 C is either equal to  or , or
there exists a quasi bliss point p(Ri) 2 R such that (i) for all a; b 2 R, if a < b < p(Ri)
or p(Ri) < b < a, then bPia, and (ii) either (for all x 2 ]  1; p(Ri)[, p(Ri)Pix), or
(for all x 2 ]p(Ri);+1[, p(Ri)Pix). We use the convention that p()   1 and
p()  +1.
Next, we show that for each prole the social ordering is strictly quasi-concave.
Let R 2 RN be such that p(Ri1)  p(Ri2)      p(Rin). Let S0  ; and for
all t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, St  fi1; i2; : : : ; itg. Thus, Sn = N . The median of M(R) =
fp(Ri1); p(Ri2); : : : ; p(Rin); p(QS0); p(QS1); : : : ; p(QSn)g is the number m(R) 2 R such
that (i) m(R) 2M(R), (ii) at least n+1 elements of M(R) are smaller than or equal
to m(R), and (iii) at least n+1 elements ofM(R) are greater than or equal to m(R).
Theorem 3.1 For all R 2 RN , f(R) is strictly quasi-concave with quasi bliss point
m(R). Furthermore, if m(R) =2 fp(QS) jS  Ng, then f(R) is single-peaked.
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Proof. Let R 2 RN . Without loss of generality, suppose p(R1)  p(R2)     
p(Rn). By independence of irrelevant alternatives, we have (i) f(R)j]  1; p(R1)] =
Q;j] 1; p(R1)] =  j] 1; p(R1)], (ii) for all t 2 f1; 2; : : : n  1g,
f(R)j[p(Rt); p(Rt+1)] = QStj[p(Rt); p(Rt+1)]; (1)
and (iii) f(R)j[p(Rn);+1[ = QN j[p(Rn);+1[ =  j[p(Rn);+1[.
Because p(Q;) = +1 and p(QN) =  1, we have m(R) 2 [p(R1); p(Rn)]. Let
a; b 2 R be such that m(R) < a < b. We show that :bf(R)a. If a  p(Rn), then the
assertion follows from f(R)j[p(Rn);+1[ =  j[p(Rn);+1[. Let t0 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n  1g
be such that a 2 [p(Rt0); p(Rt0+1)[ and c 2 ]a; p(Rt0+1)[ \ ]a; b[. We claim that
p(QSt0 )  m(R). If p(QSt0 ) > m(R), then by Lemma 3.4 at least n + 1 numbers are
greater thanm(R), namely fp(QS0); p(QS1); : : : ; p(QSt0 ); p(Rt0+1); p(Rt0+2); : : : ; p(Rn)g,
which contradicts the median property of m(R). Thus, p(QSt0 )  m(R) < a.
By (1), f(R)j[p(Rt0); p(Rt0+1)] = QSt0 j[p(Rt0); p(Rt0+1)]. Hence, :cf(R)a. Thus,
St0 2 Ds(a; c). By Lemma 3.2 and a < c < b, St0 2 D(a; b). Hence, :bf(R)a, the
desired conclusion. Similarly it can be shown that for all a; b 2 R, if b < a < m(R),
then :bf(R)a.
Let t00 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n   1g be such that m(R) 2 [p(Rt00); p(Rt00+1)]. If m(R) 2
]p(Rt00); p(Rt00+1)[, then f(R)j]p(Rt00); p(Rt00+1)[ = QSt00 j]p(Rt00); p(Rt00+1)[ implies p(f(R)) =
m(R) = p(QSt00 ) and f(R) 2 C. If m(R) 2 fp(R1); p(Rn)g, then (i) or (iii) implies
f(R) 2 C.
Suppose that m(R) = p(Rt00) and p(Rt00) =2 fp(R1); p(Rn)g. Let S  fi 2
N j p(Ri) < m(R)g and T  fi 2 N j p(Ri)  m(R)g. Then S 6= ;, S ( T , and
T 6= N . Thus, ]p(RjSj); p(RjSj+1)[ 6= ; and ]p(RjT j); p(RjT j+1)[ 6= ;. Similar arguments
as above imply that p(QT )  m(R)  p(QS). If p(QT ) < m(R), then by (1), for
all x 2 ]p(RjT j); p(RjT j+1)[, :xf(R)m(R), and f(R) 2 C. If p(QS) > m(R), then
by (1), for all x 2 ]p(RjSj); p(RjSj+1)[, :xf(R)m(R), and f(R) 2 C. Suppose that
p(QT ) = m(R) = p(QS). By (1), f(R)j]p(RjSj); p(RjSj+1)] = QSj]p(RjSj); p(RjSj+1)]
and f(R)j[p(RjT j); p(RjT j+1)[ = QT j[p(RjT j); p(RjT j+1)[. If f(R) =2 C, then for some
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a 2 ]p(RjSj); p(RjSj+1)[, af(R)m(R), and for some b 2 ]p(RjT j); p(RjT j+1)[, bf(R)m(R).
Thus, S 2 Ds(a;m(R)) and NnT 2 Ds(b;m(R)). Hence, by Lemma 3.2, S 2 D(a; b)
and NnT 2 D(a; b). Therefore, :af(R)b and :bf(R)a, which contradicts complete-
ness of f(R). Hence, f(R) 2 C.
If m(R) =2 fp(QS0) jS 0  Ng, then p(QT ) < m(R) < p(QS). Hence, by (1),
f(R) 2 R. 
Remark 3.1 If for all S  N , QS 2 f;g, then for all R 2 RN , f(R) is a
single-peaked preference relation. 
By Theorem 3.1, for all R 2 RN , the collection Q determines the social ordering
f(R) restricted to ]  1;m(R)[ and to ]m(R);+1[ (and either on ]  1;m(R)] or
[m(R);+1[). However, the quasi bliss point m(R) needs not be the socially most
preferred alternative. Next we show that Q also determines the ranking of f(R) over
all pairs (up to some arbitrary tie-breaking).
Lemma 3.5 Let R 2 RN and a; b 2 R be such that a < b. Let S  fi 2 N j aPibg,
U  fi 2 N j bPiag, and T  Nn(S [ U). Then the following holds.
(i) If for some x 2 ]a; b[, aQSx, or for some x 2 ] 1; a[, xQSb, then :bf(R)a.
(ii) If for some x 2 ]a; b[, bQS[Tx, or for some x 2 ]b;+1[, xQS[Ta, then :af(R)b.
(iii) If the presumptions of (i) and (ii) do not hold, then for all x 2 ]a; b[, we have
:af(R)x and :bf(R)x, and for all x 2 ] 1; a[ [ ]b;+1[, we have :xf(R)a
and :xf(R)b.
Proof. By denition, for all i 2 T , aIib.
First, we show (i). If for some x 2 ]a; b[, aQSx, then S 2 Ds(a; x). Thus, by
Lemma 3.2 and a < x < b, S 2 D(a; b) and :bf(R)a. If for some x 2 ] 1; a[, xQSb,
then S 2 Ds(x; b). Thus, by Lemma 3.2 and x < a < b, S 2 D(a; b) and :bf(R)a.
Second, we show (ii). If for some x 2 ]a; b[, bQS[Tx, then U 2 Ds(b; x). Thus,
by Lemma 3.2 and b > x > a, U 2 D(b; a) and :af(R)b. If for some x 2 ]b;+1[,
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xQS[Ta, then U 2 Ds(x; a). Thus, by Lemma 3.2 and x > b > a, U 2 D(b; a) and
:af(R)b.
Third, we show (iii). Because the presumptions of (i) and (ii) do not hold, we
have
(a) for all x 2 ] 1; a[, :xQSb;
(b) for all x 2 ]a; b[, :aQSx and :bQS[Tx; and
(c) for all x 2 ]b;+1[, :xQS[Ta.
Let x 2 ] 1; a[. We want to show that :xf(R)a and :xf(R)b. Because for all
i 2 N , Ri is single-peaked, we have for all i 2 T [U , aPix and bPix. Let y 2 ]x; a[. By
(a), bQSy. Thus, T [ U 2 Ds(b; y). By Lemma 3.2 and b > y > x, T [ U 2 D(b; x).
Hence, :xf(R)b. By Theorem 3.1, f(R) 2 C. Thus, from x < a < b and :xf(R)b we
obtain :xf(R)a.
Let x 2 ]a; b[. We want to show that :af(R)x and :bf(R)x. Because for all
i 2 N , Ri is single-peaked, we have for all i 2 S, xPib, for all i 2 U , xPia, and for all
i 2 T , xPia and xPib. Let y 2 ]x; b[. By (b), yQSa and T [ U 2 Ds(y; a). Thus, by
Lemma 3.2 and y > x > a, T [ U 2 D(x; a) and :af(R)x. Let z 2 ]a; x[. By (b),
zQS[T b and S [ T 2 Ds(z; b). Thus, by Lemma 3.2 and z < x < b, S [ T 2 D(x; b)
and :bf(R)x.
Let x 2 ]b;+1[. We want to show that :xf(R)a and :xf(R)b. Because for all
i 2 N , Ri is single-peaked, we have for all i 2 S[T , aPix and bPix. Let y 2 ]b; x[. By
(c), aQS[Ty. Thus, S[T 2 Ds(a; y). By Lemma 3.2 and a < y < x, S[T 2 D(a; x).
Hence, :xf(R)a. By Theorem 3.1, f(R) 2 C. Thus, from a < b < x and :xf(R)a
we obtain :xf(R)b. 
In (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.5, the ranking of f(R) over fa; bg is uniquely determined
by Q. If neither (i) nor (ii) hold, then the ranking of f(R) over fa; bg can be taken
arbitrarily without causing intransitivities.
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3.4 The Characterization
In the previous subsection we identied a monotone collection Q of strictly quasi-
concave orderings from a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.5 imply that the welfare function
is completely determined by Q. These results reveal the characteristics of such a
welfare function.
In formulating the characterization result, we need a precise denition of tie-
breaking. Given a; b 2 R, let Wfa;bg denote the set of weak orderings over fa; bg.
Obviously, only three orderings over fa; bg are possible: a is strictly preferred to b, a
and b are indi¤erent, and b is strictly preferred to a. A tie-breaking rule  is a family
of functions  fa;bg, indexed by fa; bg (where a; b 2 R and a 6= b), from WNfa;bg to
Wfa;bg. The function  fa;bg assigns to each prole of orderings over fa; bg an element
inWfa;bg. Tie-breaking should not be read to be strict because the resulting ordering
over fa; bg may be indi¤erence.
Fixed-Strictly-Quasi-Concave Welfare Function, fQ : Given a monotone col-
lection Q of strictly quasi-concave orderings such that Q; =  and QN = , and
a tie-breaking rule  , the xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare function fQ associated
with Q and  is dened as follows. Let R 2 RN and a; b 2 R be such that a  b. Let
S  fi 2 N j aPibg, U  fi 2 N j bPiag, and T  Nn(S [ U). Then
() if a = b, then afQ (R)b;
() if a < b and for some x 2 ]a; b[, aQSx, or for some x 2 ]  1; a[, xQSb, then
afQ (R)b and :bfQ (R)a;
() if a < b and for some x 2 ]a; b[, bQS[Tx, or for some x 2 ]b;+1[, xQS[Ta, then
bfQ (R)a and :afQ (R)b; and
() if a < b and (a) for all x 2 ]   1; a[, :xQSb, (b) for all x 2 ]a; b[, :aQSx
and :bQS[Tx, and (c) for all x 2 ]b;+1[, :xQS[Ta, then fQ (R)jfa; bg 
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 fa;bg(Rjfa; bg). 
Lemma 3.6 A xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare function is a well-dened welfare
function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Proof. Let Q be a monotone collection of strictly quasi-concave orderings and  be
a tie-breaking rule. Let fQ be dened as above.
First, we prove well-denedness of fQ . We have to show that () and () exclude
each other.
Let a; b 2 R be such that () holds for a and b. Thus, a < b. If for some
x 2 ]a; b[, aQSx, then by strict quasi-concavity of QS and a < x < b, :bQSx. Thus,
by transitivity, :bQSa. If for some x 2 ] 1; a[, xQSb, then by strict quasi-concavity
of QS and x < a < b, :bQSa. Hence, in both cases we have :bQSa and aQSb.
Because Q is monotone and aQSb, by (i.ii) of Lemma 3.4 we have for all y 2 ]a; b[,
:bQS[Ty. Because Q is monotone and aQSb, by (i.i) of Lemma 3.4 we have for all
y 2 ]b;+1[, :yQS[Ta. Hence, () does not hold.
Second, we show that fQ is a welfare function. Let R 2 RN . By denition, fQ (R)
is complete. It remains to show that fQ (R) is transitive. Let a; b; c 2 R be such that
a < b < c. If :afQ (R)b and :cfQ (R)b, then fQ (R)jfa; b; cg is transitive. Thus, in
proving transitivity of fQ (R), it su¢ ces to show the following two implications: if
afQ (R)b, then :cfQ (R)a; and if cfQ (R)b, then :afQ (R)c.
We only prove the rst implication. The second implication follows similarly. Let
afQ (R)b. Then () or () holds for a and b. Let S  fi 2 N j aPibg, U  fi 2
N j bPiag, T  Nn(S [ U), and S 0  fi 2 N j aPicg. Because a < b < c and for all
i 2 N , Ri is single-peaked, we have S [ T  S 0.3 We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: afQ (R)b because of ().
If for some x 2 ]a; b[, aQSx, then, because Q is monotone and S  S 0, for some
y 2 ]x; b[, aQS0y. Since a < b < c, we have y 2 ]a; c[ and by (), :cfQ (R)a. If
3Note that this implication remains true if for all i 2 N , Ri is strictly quasi-concave.
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for some x 2 ]   1; a[, xQSb, then, because Q is monotone and S  S 0, for some
y 2 ]x; a[, yQS0b. Thus, by strict quasi-concavity of QS0 and y < a < b < c, yQS0c.
Hence, by (), :cfQ (R)a.
Case 2: afQ (R)b because of ().
We show that () holds for a and c. Let x 2 ]b; c[. Then by (), part (c), :xQS[Ta.
Thus, aQS[Tx. Because Q is monotone and S [ T  S 0, for some y 2 ]x; c[, aQS0y.
Thus, by y 2 ]a; c[ and (), :cfQ (R)a, the desired conclusion.
Third, we show that fQ satises weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives. Because Q; =  and QN = , it is easy to check that fQ satises
weak Pareto. Obviously, by denition, fQ satises independence of irrelevant alter-
natives. 
The following theorem characterizes the class of welfare functions satisfying Ar-
rows requirements on the domain of all single-peaked preferences over a one-dimensional
policy space.
Theorem 3.2 On the domain of single-peaked preferences, the class of xed-strictly-
quasi-concave welfare functions is characterized by weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives.
Proof. From Lemma 3.6 it follows that a xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare func-
tion is a well-dened welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives.
Conversely, let f be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence
of irrelevant alternatives. Lemma 3.4 shows the existence of a monotone collection
Q of strictly quasi-concave orderings. Let R 2 RN and a; b 2 R. From Lemma 3.5
it follows that f(R)jfa; bg satises the denitions (), (), and (). Finally, if ()
holds, then dene  fa;bg(Rjfa; bg)  f(R)jfa; bg. Now it is obvious that f is a xed-
strictly-quasi-concave welfare function associated with Q and  . 
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Theorem 3.2 remains valid if the set of alternatives is an interval and/or each
individuals preference domain is the set of all symmetric single-peaked preferences.
Since the set of symmetric single-peaked preferences is identical with the set of spatial
preferences, Theorem 3.2 applies equally to spatial environments. Those environments
play an important role in political economy and political science.
3.5 Majority Voting
In this subsection we explore the relation between xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare
functions and majority voting. Under majority voting, for a given prole of prefer-
ences, one alternative is ranked above another if and only if a majority of voters
weakly prefers the former alternative to the latter. If the number of individuals is
odd, majority voting is a well-dened welfare function (Black, 1948; Arrow, 1951).
However, if the number of individuals is even, then the social indi¤erence relation
may be intransitive. In resolving these intransitivities, we add an odd number of
xed strictly quasi-concave relations and determine the majority preference relation
for the prole of individuals preferences and the xed voters preferences.
Let O  (O0; O1; : : : ; On) denote a prole of n + 1 xed voterspreferences such
that O0 = , On = , and for all t 2 f1; : : : ; n   1g, Ot 2 C. Let Q(O) denote the
collection of strictly quasi-concave preferences associated with O, i.e. for all S  N ,
QS = OjSj. We call O strongly monotone when for all S; T  N such that S  T and
all a; b 2 R such that a < b, (i) if aOjSjb, then aOjT jb; and (ii) if bOjT ja, then bOjSja.
Obviously, if O is strongly monotone, then Q(O) is monotone. Given a strongly
monotone prole O of n+1 xed voters, the majority welfare function gO associated
with O is dened as follows. For all R 2 RN and all a; b 2 R,
agO(R)b,jfi 2 N j :bRiagj [ jft 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng j :bOtagj
 jfi 2 N j :aRibgj [ jft 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng j :aOtbgj:
The majority tie breaking rule O associated with O is dened as follows: for all
R 2 RN and all a; b 2 R, Ofa;bg(Rjfa; bg)  gO(R)jfa; bg.
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If O is a strongly monotone prole of n+1 xed voters, then the majority welfare
function gO is the xed-strictly-quasi-concave welfare function associated with Q(O)
and the majority tie-breaking rule O.
Proposition 3.1 If O is a strongly monotone prole of n + 1 xed voters, then
gO = f
Q(O)
O
.
Proof. Let R 2 RN and a; b 2 R be such that a < b. Let S  fi 2 N j aPibg,
U  fi 2 N j bPiag, and T  Nn(S [ U). It su¢ ces to show that fQ(O)O jfa; bg =
gO(R)jfa; bg.
Let afQ(O)
O
(R)b. If afQ(O)
O
(R)b because of (), then by denition of O, agO(R)b.
If afQ(O)
O
(R)b because of (), then :bOjSja and because O is strongly monotone, at
least n + 1 voters strictly prefer a to b, namely S [ fjSj; jSj + 1; : : : ; jN jg. Thus,
:bgO(R)a. Similarly it can be shown that bfQ(O)
O
(R)a implies bgO(R)a.
Let agO(R)b. First, we show that if :bOjSja, then () does not hold. Because O is
strongly monotone, we have :bOjS[T ja. Thus, by strict quasi-concavity of OjS[T j, for
all x 2 ]a; b[, :bOjS[T jx, and for all x 2 ]b;+1[, :xOjS[T ja, and () does not hold.
Thus, if :bOjSja, then () or () holds for a and b and by denition, afQ(O)O (R)b.
Similarly it can be shown if bgO(R)a and :aOjS[T jb, then () does not hold and
bf
Q(O)
O
(R)a.
If bOjSja and aOjS[T jb, then () and () do not hold and by (), f
Q(O)
O
jfa; bg =
gO(R)jfa; bg, the desired conclusion. 
If fQ is an anonymous welfare function, then for all coalitions S, Q
S depends
only on the cardinality of jSj. In particular, the prole (Q;; Qf1g; Qf1;2g; : : : ; QN) is a
prole of n+1 xed voters. However, majority welfare functions are not characterized
by weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and anonymity. This is due
to the fact that the tie breaking rule  need not be the majority tie breaking rule
associated with the prole of n+ 1 xed voters.
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If n is odd, for all k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; 1
2
(n   1)g, Ok = , and for all l 2 f12(n   1) +
1; : : : ; ng, Ol = , then Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 yield Blacks celebrated
median voter theorem saying that the median of the individual peaks is equal to the
alternative that is top-ranked according to simple majority preference. Let gm denote
the simple majority welfare function. As an application of our results we show the
following. If the number of voters is odd, the policy space is one-dimensional and the
domain of preferences includes all spatial preferences, then simple majority voting is
transitive if and only if each voters preference relation is strictly quasi-concave. Let
S denote the set of all symmetric single-peaked preferences (or spatial preferences).
Theorem 3.3 Let jN j be odd and jN j 6= 1. The domain of strictly quasi-concave
preferences CN is the unique maximal domain RN such that
(i) SN  RN  WN and
(ii) simple majority voting is transitive on the domain RN .
Proof. Obviously, jN j  3. It is straightforward to adjust the denition of a xed-
strictly-quasi-concave welfare function to CN and to show that Lemma 3.6 remains
true. Hence, by Proposition 3.1, simple majority voting is transitive on the domain
CN .
Suppose that RN is a domain such that SN  RN and majority voting is tran-
sitive. Thus, gm is a welfare function with domain RN satisfying weak Pareto and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Suppose that RnC 6= ;. Let R0 2 RnC.
Dene f : SNnfng ! W as follows: for all R 2 SNnfng, f(R)  gm(R;R0). Because
gm is simple majority voting and jN j  3, f satises weak Pareto. Thus, f is a wel-
fare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let
S  f1; : : : ; 1
2
(jN j   1)g. By denition of f and the fact that gm is simple majority
voting, we have ~f(S;Nn(S[fng)) = R0. Because all lemmas hold on the domain SN
and R0 is not strictly quasi-concave, this is a contradiction to Lemma 3.4. 
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we solve a classical open problem in Arrovian social choice. For a one-
dimensional policy space and the domain of single-peaked preferences, we characterize
the social welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. As a corollary we obtain that majority voting is transitive if and only if
the number of individuals is odd and individual preferences are strictly quasi-concave.
A parallel line of research considers social choice functions. In this case, the ob-
jective is to choose for each admissible set, called an agenda, the socially optimal
alternatives in this set. Arrows choice axiom requires that if for an admissible set
and some admissible subset of it, some choices made at the former set belong to the
smaller set, then the choices at the latter set are exactly the choices made at the for-
mer set that belong to the smaller set (Arrow, 1959).4 In spatial environments with
one-dimensional policy spaces and agenda domain consisting of all compact intervals,
the social choice functions satisfying weak Pareto, Arrows choice axiom, and indepen-
dence of infeasible alternatives have been investigated (Moulin, 1984; Ehlers, 2001).
These papers obtain characterizations of the generalized median rulesby these and
additional axioms. A generalized median rule assigns to each compact interval and
each prole the point belonging to the compact interval that is closest to the median
of the peaks reported by the voters and 2N xed voters. The quasi bliss points of the
2N xed strictly quasi-concave preferences play the role of these xed voters. The
quasi bliss point of the social ordering chosen by an Arrovian welfare function for a
prole of preferences is the outcome of the generalized median rule applied to this
prole of quasi bliss points. However, the natural correspondence between generalized
median rules and Arrovian welfare functions fails because the median may not be the
socially most preferred alternative. The class of welfare functions underlying median
rules is smaller than the class of Arrovian welfare functions: in the former the social
4Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001) consider Arrovian-type axioms in elections in which
candidates have the possibilty to withdraw. See also Ehlers and Weymark (2003).
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ordering is single-peaked.
The same applies to the strand of literature on strategy-proof social choice rules
when the set of alternatives is one-dimensional (Moulin, 1980; Border and Jordan,
1983; Kim and Roush, 1984; Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti, 1993). For the case of
a nite set of alternatives and unrestricted domain, Satterthwaite (1975) associates
with each social choice rule satisfying strategy-proofness and unanimity an Arrovian
welfare function. For his construction it is essential that any pair of alternatives can
be moved to the top two positions in each agents preference relation. It is obvious
that this trick does not work in one-dimensional single-peaked environments.
Independent and parallel research by Sethuraman, Teo, and Vohra (2003,2006)
considers Arrovian social welfare functions for a nite set of alternatives. Indi¤er-
ences between two alternatives are excluded for both individual preferences and social
orderings. Sethuraman, Teo, and Vohra (2003) establish an integer linear program-
ming formulation for the problem of nding an Arrovian welfare function in this
setup. For neutral Arrovian social welfare functions they nd an easy existence test
and for the domain of nite alternatives with single-peaked preferences they nd that
an Arrovian social welfare function is anonymous and monotonic if and only if it is
simple majority voting with n + 1 xed voters. Sethuraman, Teo, and Vohra (2006)
generalize this result to any domain with no Condorcet triples and which contains an
ordering and its inversion. Their works and ours are distinct in serval aspects:
First, the last two characterization results only hold when individual and social
indi¤erences are excluded. In our paper both individual indi¤erences and social in-
di¤erences are allowed and any Arrovian welfare function needs to be described with
the help of a tie-breaking rule.
Second, with the exclusion of indi¤erences for single-peaked preferences and the
niteness of the set of alternatives, in their papers any social ordering of an anonymous
Arrovian welfare function is single-peaked and the set of social orderings is a subset
of the set of single-peaked preferences. For a continuum of alternatives with single-
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peaked preferences this is no longer true. Social orderings are strictly quasi-concave
and those orderings are not necessarily single-peaked.
Third, for a continuum of alternatives we cannot use their (nite) integer linear
programming formulation for the problem of nding an Arrovian welfare function.
Our proof techniques are in the spirit of Arrows Theorem in the sense that we use
only the basic requirements weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives
and we determine exactly how decisiveness spreads from one pair of alternatives to
other pairs of alternatives.
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